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Article 4

Articles
SOME THOUGHTS ON REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
MARC

I.

STEINBERG*

The proliferation of hostile bids for corporate control has resulted
in the emergence of defensive and offensive maneuvers limited only by
the ingenuity of counsel and investment bankers. The terms for some of
these maneuvers, including "golden parachutes," "shark repellant" provisions, "lock-ups," "poison pills," "scorched earth" tactics, "whiteknights," and the recently coined "Pac-Man" defense,' suggest that
there is something fundamentally wrong with the process. In short,
tender offers are not a game in which corporate managements are entitled to play roulette with shareholder equity, employee security, and
community welfare. Unfortunately, managements on both sides of these
so-called "battles" for corporate control more than occasionally neglect
these important responsibilities. Target managements all too often have
blindly fended off offers at substantial premiums while irretrievably
wasting corporate assets and depriving shareholders of an opportunity
to tender their stock. 2 Some offeror managements also have delin© 1984 by Marc I. Steinberg
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M., Yale University. Member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
I wish to thank Ralph C. Ferrara, Esq., Professor Oscar S. Gray, Ellen F. Kandell, Esq.,
Stanley Sporkin, Esq., and Professor Gordon G. Young for their helpful comments. The
views expressed herein are those of the author.
1. Definitions of these maneuvers are provided in Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender
Offers- A Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 Md. L. Rev. 225, 237 app. (1984). For a
discussion of various defensive maneuvers and their application, see M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 11.08 (1984); Block & Miller, The Responsibilities of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 52-66 (1983). See also
Friedenberg,jawsIll- The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 32 (1982); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments. Stnctural Limitations
on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcordsor
Ripofs? Some Comments on Special Termination Agreements, 3 PACE L. REv. 15 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aft'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). There, prior to the time that Carter
Hawley's tender offer proposal for Marshall Field stock was made at $42.00 per share, Marshall Field stock was selling in the market at approximately $22.00 per share. Marshall
Field's management successfully fended off the proposal by, inter alia, engaging in a number
of dubious "defensive" acquisitions and filing an antitrust suit against Carter Hawley. After
Carter Hawley withdrew the offer prior to it becoming effective, the price of Marshall Field
stock declined to $19.76 per share. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 676
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quently utilized questionable practices to make tender offers amounting
to several million dollars, sometimes after employees have made significant salary and benefit concessions. 3
The recurrence of this kind of irresponsible behavior, and Justice
Goldberg's provocative comments on particular abuses associated with
hostile tender offers,4 prompt me to offer a few of my own thoughts on
the subject. These thoughts are loosely grouped under four headings:
application of the business judgment rule to target companies' management; application of existing federal law to target management; abuses
that ought to be the subject of additional federal legislation; and a tentative proposal for vesting primary jurisdiction over pending tender offers in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 5
APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE TO TARGET
MANAGEMENT

In general, the courts have not adequately redressed the misconduct of target managements in connection with hostile tender offers.
Target managements have been protected by, inter alia, the mantle of
the business judgment rule, under which corporate fiduciaries responsible for taking defensive actions have been shielded from liability for the
ensuing consequences. 6 The courts have failed to recognize that, partic(5th ed. 1982). The Seventh Circuit on appeal, over a vigorous dissent, affirmed the district
court's grant of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Approximately one year later,
Marshall Field was taken over in a friendly transaction by Batus, Inc. at a price of $30.00 per
share. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
3. Prior to U.S. Steel's 1981 offer for Marathon Oil Co., for example, employees of the
former company had agreed to significant concessions. United Steel Workers v. United Steel
Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See generaly Millspaugh, Plant Closings and the
Prospectsfor ajudiialResponse, 8 J. CORP. L. 483, 491-92 (1983). Cf. Hymowitz & O'Boyle,
Two Steel Mills Girdfor Result ofMerger Bid, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 35, col. 3 (A worker at
one of U.S. Steel's plants remarked that "[w]e gave [U.S. Steel] concessions and finally got
back to work. I thought the bad times were finally over. But now with this [proposed]
merger [between U.S. Steel and National Steel Corp.], I don't know if I have a job or not.").
The Wall Street Journal article also noted that some of U.S. Steel's employees are bitter
about what they view as the company's inadequate investment in modernizing its plant.
4. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 225-26.
5. The purpose of this Article is not to present a comprehensive analysis of the many
issues raised by federal regulation of tender offers. The work is offered instead as a reflection
upon selected problems associated with tender offers, with suggestions for remedial action. It
is hoped that its contents will stimulate further discussion of the problems noted, and that the
ideas set forth will prove to be among the elements of an effective overall solution to inequities
in the tender offer process.
6. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.) (applying Delaware
law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New Jersey law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New York law); Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D.
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ularly when such actions deprive shareholders of the right to tender
their stock, the basic premise underlying the business judgment rule is
not valid in this context and application of the rule therefore is
inappropriate.'
The business judgment rule provides that corporate officers and directors will be shielded from judicial inquiry into the propriety of their
decisions and from liability for harm to the corporation resulting from
their decisions, so long as (1) the decisions were within management's
authority to make, and (2) such corporate fiduciaries have "[a] informed
[themselves] and made reasonable inquiry with respect to the business
judgment[s]; [b] acted in good faith and without a disabling conflict of
interest; and [c] had a rational basis for the business judgment[s]." ' As
the Supreme Court of Delaware recently pointed out,9 the doctrine is an
acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of corporate directors
under state law. "It is a [rebuttable] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company." ' That presumption is inappropriate,
however, with respect to decisions made by target managements that
preclude shareholders from tendering their stock in response to a hostile
tender offer. 1
Mich. 1978) (applying Michigan law). See generally M.

STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS--A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 225-39 (1983).

7. With the benefit of the business judgment rule and restrictive federal court decisions
construing the Williams Act, target managements usually are able to successfully fend off
hostile bidders. See Austin, Tender Offer Movement Ofin 1982, Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 15,
col. 1, ("In 1982, only 21.9 percent of the contested tender offers were completely successful.
On the other hand, 53.1 percent of all the contested offers were completely unsuccessful.").
8.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

AND STRUCTURE:

RESTATEMENT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI DRAFr
RESTATEMENT]. For discussion of the ALI's draft formulation of the business judgment rule,
see Steinberg, The Amerz'an Law Institute's Draft Restatement on CorporateGovernance.- The Business
Judgment Rule, RelatedPrinciples,andSome General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 (1984).
For other formulations of the business judgment rule, see Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule
Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111-12 (1979); Steinberg, Application of the BusinessJudgment
Rule andRelatedJudicialPrmncples-Retectionsfom a CorporateAccountability Perspective, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 903, 904-05 (1981).
9. Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, 1983 (Del. Mar. 1, 1984), discussed in Delaware Court Clarfies
Demand RequirementforDerivative Suits, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 480 (Mar. 9,
1984).
10. Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, 1983, slip op. at 12. The court also stated that "under the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." Id.
at 14. See generally Veasey & Manning, Codifed Standard--Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef?, 35
Bus. LAW. 919, 926-30 (1980) (discusses inconsistent indications in the cases as to whether the
standard of care required of corporate directors under Delaware law is ordinary care or
merely avoidance of gross negligence).
11. Eg., M. STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 237-39; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
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Because target management is likely to have a disabling conflict of
interest, 2 the business judgment rule should not be applied to defensive
actions undertaken by target companies in response to or in anticipation
of tender offers, particularly if such actions materially impede or preclude shareholders from tendering their shares. Directors and officers of
the target corporation know that they are likely to be replaced if an offer
succeeds. "Inside" directors"3 therefore have a personal financial interest in defeating tender offers, unless the impact of a successful offer upon
them has been ameliorated by "golden parachutes" 1 4 or some other
form of protection. 5 Even "inside" directors who have such protection

Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1745-47 (1981). See generally
Comment, The Misapplcation ofthe BusinessJudgment Rule in Contestsfor CorporateControl, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 980 (1982). Cf. Lowenstein, PruningDeadwood in Hostile Takeovers." 4 Proposalfor
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 313-14 (1983) (the courts' use of the business judgment
rule in the context of hostile tender offers necessitiates a legislative solution); Note, Tender Offer
Defensive Tactics and the BusinessJudgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621 (1983)(a less deferential
version of the business judgment rule ought to be applied in the tender offer context).
12. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981). But cf. Northwest
Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) ("[Wlhenever a tender
offer is extended and the management of the threatened company resists, the officers and
directors may be accused of trying to preserve their jobs at the expense of the corporation.
• . . Yet, management has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are
detrimental to the company or its stockholders.').
13. "Inside" directors include those who also hold positions as officers of the corporation,
or who are otherwise employed by the company, for example, as in-house corporate counsel.
"Inside" directors also include those directors who may be said to have a pecuniary interest in
the corporation's affairs greater than that arising from ownership of a less-than-controlling
block of the corporation's shares. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)
(burden of proof as to whether a stock repurchase was in the corporate interest was not as
great for directors who were merely "substantial shareholders" as for those who were the
Chief Executive Officer and corporate counsel, since the former did not have "a personal
pecuniary interest in the decisions made by the board of directors. .
").
14. The use of "golden parachutes" has generated extensive criticism. These executive
compensation agreements, which generally provide generous severance remuneration for key
officers or directors upon a change in corporate control, have been attacked as constituting a
waste of corporate assets, as unconscionable self-dealing and hence a breach of the duty of
loyalty, and as an unwarranted anti-takeover device. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 23031; Riger, supra note 1, at 25-39. On the other hand, proponents assert that such compensation agreements may benefit shareholders by enabling the corporation to retain high quality
management and more securely aligning management's interests with those of the shareholders when a hostile bid is made. E.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, U.S. SEC,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. Professors Easterbrook and Jarrell assert: "Perhaps such [golden parachute] guarantees are 'unseemly,' but they grease the skids of offers by decreasing the role managerial selfprotection plays in defending." Id. at 103 (separate statement of Easterbrook & Jarrell). See
generally Note, Golden Parachutes.- Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117
(1983).
15. Some have taken the position that defeat by target management of a tender offer
virtually is never in the best long-term interests of shareholders as a whole. See Easterbrook &

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 43:240

and "outside" directors who may not be deemed financially interested
nonetheless may be "interested" in maintaining their
positions of power, prestige and prominence. ....
They are
"interested" in defending against outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or maintained in
power . . .. And they are "interested" in maintaining the
public reputation of their own leadership and stewardship
against the claims of "raiders" who say that they can do

better. 16
In addition, the element of structural bias is ever present. 7 Incumbent
management's control of the proxy machinery and general informational processes, 8 combined with its control of the methods for selecting
outside directors, 9 frequently result in undue directorial loyalty to management rather than the exercise of independent judgment.20

Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161, 1174-75 (1981).
16. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
17. "Structural bias" may be defined as "inherent prejudice... resulting from the composition and character of the board of directors [and management]." Note, The BusinessJudgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n. 14 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Derivitive Suits]. For further discussion of the concept of structural
bias, see id. at 619-26. Cf. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981) (recognizing the possibility of structural bias, the court
held that, due to conflicts of interest, the board was incompetent to compromise the plaintiff
shareholders' derivative claims); Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709,
716-18 (Iowa 1983) (recognizing structural bias problem in refusing to dismiss derivative suit
against corporate fiduciaries where members comprising the special litigation committee were
appointed to the committee by defendant fiduciaries).
The inherent problem of structural bias is discussed at length in Note, The Propriety of
JudicialDeference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Note, JudcialDeference]. Drawing upon studies of group dynamics, the author of the
Note concluded: "Given cohesiveness and informational dependence in the boardroom, directors are likely to conform to the expectations both of management and of their fellow
board members." Id. at 1901.
18. See, e.g., Mace, Directors.-Myth and Reaht---Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293,
297-303 (1979) ("C.E.O.'s continue to control board functions through the proxy process.");
Note, JudialDeferenwe, supra note 17, at 1898 ("Confronted by difficult issues of business
policy and largely dependent upon management for information about these issues, directors
are likely to believe that management's views and judgments are worth adopting.") (footnote
omitted).
19. See Comment, supra note 11, at 1002 n.106 (outside directors are selected by C.E.O.'s
partially on the basis of whether they can be expected "not to rock the boat"; the problems
arising from management's control over directors may be mitigated, but not entirely eliminated, by utilizing nominating committees of disinterested directors to control the corporate
proxy machinery).
20. See Note, Derivative Suits, supra note 17, at 619-22. Cf. NoteJudcial Deference, supra
note 17, at 1896-1902 (discussing the pressures on directors to conform their judgments to
those of management).
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Target management therefore has an inherent conflict of interest
when faced with a hostile tender offer. 21 Drawing on traditional common law standards 22 as well as the more recent "interested director"
statutes,2 3 it may be argued that the burden should be placed on target
management to show the substantive and procedural propriety of its
conduct. Hence, to pass muster under state law, target management
should be required to prove that its actions were taken for the corporation's best interest and were intrinsically fair to the corporation and
other affected parties.2 4
21. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981) ("in the
context of a tender offer, the directors have an inherent conflict of interest")(citation omitted).

The Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized that a similar conflict of interest may
arise when, on the recommendation of a special litigation committee comprised of
nondefendant directors, a corporation seeks dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit. In
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), that court held that if demand on the
board is excused, a two-step test should be applied in determining whether to grant the corporation's motion to dismiss: first, the court should inquire into the special litigation committee's independence and good faith and the bases supporting its conclusions, with the burden
of proof on the corporation; second, providing that the first step is satisfied, the court should
apply "its own independent business judgment" and "should, when appropriate, give special
consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests." Id. at 788-89. See Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, 1983 slip op. at 16 (Del. Mar. 1, 1984)
(the chancery court "must" apply both steps).
22. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867 (3d Cir. 1968); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143
(Del. 1975); Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510-12 (Del. 1939). As the Supreme Court of
Delaware stated in Guth: "The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and
loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale." Id. at 510.
23. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983);
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-419 (1975 & Supp. 1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 41 (1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963). For judicial decisions construing these interested director statutes, see Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.,
109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419-21, 241 P.2d 66, 74-76 (1952); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,
221-22 (Del. 1976). See generally Bulbolia & Pinto,Statutoy Responses to InterestedDirectors' Transactions. A Watering Down of Fiduca Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 201 (1977).
24. Cf. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381-83 (2d Cir. 1980). Under New
Jersey law the business judgment rule should be applied when the issuance and sale of shares
to a white knight is challenged, but after the plaintiff has shown that a majority of the issuer's
directors either expected that the transaction would serve to perpetuate their own control, or
approved the transaction under the domination or control of directors who had such a personal control interest, the burden of proof will shift to the directors who then must prove that
the transaction was fair to the corporation. Plaintiff failed to meet the initial burden of proof,
however, and so the burden did not shift. Id Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del.
1964). Directors who authorized an issuer's repurchase of shares from a dissident shareholder
necessarily had a conflict of interest when a threat to the directors' control was involved, and
the burden of proof was upon them to show that the purchase was in the corporation's interest. Defendants whose interests were not clearly pecuniary were not held to as high a standard
of proof as those with "personal and pecuniary interest in the transaction." Id. at 555.
If the approach recommended in the text is not adopted, at least courts should in-
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One might note in this context that shareholders who are denied
the opportunity to tender their shares at a substantial premium must
find application of the business judgment rule to be egregiously unfair.
Under Delaware law, for example, the presumption of good faith and
care is rebuttable only by showing that management's sole or primary
purpose for its conduct was to retain control.25 Corporate fiduciaries
who are given the benefit of the presumption almost always will be able
to proffer a "legitimate" business purpose for their actions, including
actions employed solely to perpetuate incumbent management's position. 2 ' This outcome is even more assured if management uses expert
counsel and investment bankers to lay a foundation for and to structure
its actions.
Some may argue that the duties imposed upon corporate fiduciaries
by state law counterbalance any potential conflict of interest on the part
of target management, and thus make application of the business judgment rule appropriate.2 ' This response is deficient in at least two respects. First, if the principles of corporate governance, shareholder
welfare, and market integrity are to have practical meaning in this context, management cannot be permitted to invoke a presumption of disinterested decisionmaking in a situation in which its interests are so
likely to conflict with those of the shareholders. 29 Second, certain investment decisions are to be made by shareholders, without undue manage-

quire whether the decision to oppose the tender offer and to engage in defensive tactics was
made primarily by disinterested directors or by those directors whose livelihoods and economic interests depended on the continued separate existence of the subject corporation. See
Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60
B.U.L. REV. 403, 468-69 (1980); Williams, Role ofDiretors in Takeover Offers, 13 REV. SEC.
REG. 963, 965 (1980). Such an approach generally is not advised, however, for the reasons
noted in supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denzed,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (plaintiff must show either bad faith or predominance of an improper
control motive to prevent application of the business judgment rule on a motion for directed
verdict under Delaware law); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (also
construing Delaware law).
26. The rule's underlying presumption is especially likely to be a cover for abuse if management's consideration of noninvestor interests is deemed to be within the presumption. See
infla note 41.
27. Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 314; Steinberg, supra note 8, at 906-07. As discussed
earlier, target management usually is successful in fending off hostile offers. See supra note 7.
28. Certain actions taken by corporate managers which have the effect of perpetuating
their control may be held invalid under state law. See, e.g., Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,
421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (holding that a board of directors could not set the date of an
annual stockholder meeting so as to leave insufficient time for submission of materials required of nominees under anti-takeover amendments to the corporation's by-laws). See generally Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 24, at 433-49.
29. See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
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ment intervention, absent good reason otherwise. Two common
30
examples are a shareholder's decision to sell shares in the open market,
and the decision to tender stock in response to a particular takeover
bid. 1 Given the nature of the shareholder's traditional interest in disposing of his or her stock ownership, fiduciary duties do not entitle management to preempt such decisions absent foreseeable harm caused by
the purchaser.3 2 As one court has pointed out:
What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer controversies is that the shareholders, not the directors, have the right of
franchise with respect to the shares owned by them.

.

.

. The

Directors are free to continue by proper legal means to express
to the shareholders their objection and hostility to the [subject]
proposal, but they are not free to deny them their right to pass
upon this
offer or any other offer for the purchase of their
33
shares.

Notwithstanding target management's inherent conflict of interest
when faced with a hostile tender offer,3 4 there may be circumstances in
which incumbent management, in accord with its obligations to shareholders, employees, and affected communities, 31 ought to be entitled to
take certain defensive actions to fend off detrimental takeover bids.
State law provisions may be needed, moreover, to ensure that the risk of
incurring potentially astronomical monetary liability will not lead tar30. See Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 266 ("In a routine market transaction, there is no
room for management to inject its views as to the price at which shares should trade and there
is no 'corporate interest,' it is said, that would justify the target company management's using
the corporate treasury to influence the transaction.").
31. See generally id. at 266-67; Cohn, Tender Ofrs and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to
Determine the Validity of Target Management Defensive Measures, 66 IowA L. REV. 475, 509-24
(1981).
32. There are some exceptions. If a controlling shareholder sells out without making a
reasonable investigation of its purchaser, for example, he may be held liable for damages
incurred by the corporation and minority shareholders due to the purchaser's looting of the
corporation. E.g., DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 696-98, 120
Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-61 (1975); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 650-51 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1941).
33. Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dictum). See
also infta notes 54, 55 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
35. See Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Colorado law in a shareholder derivative suit, the court stated that management of a corporation
engaged principally in the publication of a large metropolitan newspaper had duties to the
stockholders, the employees, and the public); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 408 (Purdon 1967),
amended by Act No. 1983-92, 1983 Pa. Legis. Serv. 773, 774 (Purdon) (corporate fiduciaries
"may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action
upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors."). See infra
notes 41, 82-85 and accompanying text.
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get managements to avoid taking defensive actions even when they are
appropriate. Two proposals are offered here: First, if otherwise appropriate, the business judgment rule may be applied in its entirety to actions that do not materially impede or preclude shareholders from
tendering their stock. Hence, management may enjoy the benefit of the
rule's presumption when it recommends that the hostile offer be rejected,3 6 raises its dividend rate,37 induces a "white knight" to enter the
fray,3" or takes other actions which do not interfere with the shareholders' freedom to accept any tender offer of their choice.39 Second, if defensive maneuvers do materially impede or preclude shareholders from
tendering their shares to a particular bidder," management should be
required to prove that its actions were fair to the corporation and its
shareholders, subject to two provisos: management may take noninvestor interests into account,4 1 and a ceiling may be placed on the amount
of damages recoverable from corporate fiduciaries.4 2 To protect ade-

36. Cf. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978) (applying a fairly lenient standard in determining whether the target's press releases were false or misleading).
37. Id.
38. A "white knight" generally is a "friendly" party which comes to the aid of incumbent
target management in its efforts to fend off a hostile takeover bid by, for example, purchasing
a large block of the target's authorized but unissued stock or making a competing tender offer
at a higher price.
39. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 225-28.
40. For examples of defensive maneuvers that materially impeded or precluded tender by
shareholders to a particular bidder and were held to give rise to liability, see Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374-76 (6th Cir. 1981) (options to sell substantial block of
the company's stock and its "crown jewel"); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (issuance of substantial block of shares to a
friendly third party); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (acquisition of another enterprise to interpose antitrust obstacles to a tender offer). But see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (acquisition of another enterprise in the
context of a tender offer held to be protected by the business judgment rule); Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (sale of an asset resulting in making target company less attractive to bidder held to be protected by the business judgment rule).
41. See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 408 (Purdon 1967), amended by Act No. 1983-92,
1983 Pa. Legis. Serv. 773, 774 (Purdon); O'Boyle & Carey, Gulfs Departing Pittsburgh Would
Deala Harsh Blow to City's Economy and 1ide, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 33, col. 4 ("Standard
Oil Co. of California's $13.3 billion bid to acquire the oil giant has brought shudders to
Pittsburgh charities, university presidents, tax officials, ministers and everyone else who benefits from Gulf's financial and civic might."). It is important that the burden ofjustification be
placed on corporate fiduciaries when they take noninvestor interests into account. Otherwise,
the presumption of the business judgment rule would be further extended, making it a nearly
insurmountable barrier for an aggrieved party. Application of the business judgment rule in
this context thus would represent an overly solicitous approach to target management. See
generally iwfta notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
42. Cf. ALI DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 7.06(d), (e) (establishing a ceiling on
damages in duty of care cases in the absence of culpability surpassing that of negligence).
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quately the competing interests at stake, the ceiling on damages should
be high enough to deter corporate malfeasance, but yet not so exorbi43
tant as to dissuade courts from imposing liability.
It should be evident that by taking the position that the business
judgment rule should not be applied to certain defensive actions by target management, I am by no means urging the rule's abrogation. The
business judgment rule serves important policy considerations when it is

43. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. Cf. ALI DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra
note 8, at § 7.06(e), which sets forth the following monetary limits for the maximum recovery
available in duty of care cases where the defendant's culpability is no greater than negligence:
(i) in the case of a director who, at the time of the events giving rise to the
action, was not otherwise an employee or officer of the corporation in whose name
the action is brought, or of any corporation possessing control over, controlled by, or
under common control with, such corporation, the ceiling shall not exceed (A)
$200,000, nor fall below (B) $50,000; and
(ii) in the case of any other defendant whose liability is based upon a duty
owed to the corporation as an employee or as a corporate fiduciary, the range shall
not exceed (A) the higher of (1) $200,000 or (2) twice such defendant's gross compensation from the corporation for the most recently ended calendar year, nor fall
below (B) such defendant's gross compensation from the corporation for the same
year; provided, however, that the court may utilize a different recent year if it finds
that such compensation was artificially understated for the most recently ended
year.
(citation omitted).
The question arises what standard should apply and what relief should be available
when incumbent management, with disinterested shareholder approval, induces the corporation to adopt anti-takeover (or shark repellant) provisions prior to the presence of a hostile
bid. It may be argued that disinterested shareholder approval accompanied by full disclosure
should insulate the provisions from successful challenge. Cf. Rivoli Theatre Co. v. Allison,
152 A.2d 449, 451 (Pa. 1959) (conversation with a single stockholder fell short of the full and
frank disclosure to all stockholders necessary for ratification of contracts); State cx tel Hayes
Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 385, 391 P.2d 979, 986 (1964). Within
the framework set forth in this article, however, the business judgment rule should apply only
to those shark repellant provisions that do not materially impede or preclude hostile bidders
from coming forward with a viable offer. See generally Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501, 506-07
(Del. 1965). To the extent such provisions materially impede or preclude the making of hostile offers, courts should scrutinize their terms to determine whether they are fair to shareholders. "Preclusive" shark repellant provisions may be analogized to certain self-dealing
transactions that, by their very nature, involve constructive fraud, waste of corporate assets,
or palpable overreaching. In such cases, shareholder approval does not inhibit the courts
from evaluating the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d
512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978) (only unanimous stockholder ratification is sufficient to justify a
waste or gift of corporate assets); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968) (under
New Jersey law, there can be no effective ratification where a majority of shares is held by
those "interested" in the transaction). Providing that no monetary losses have been incurred
(which normally would be the case when suit is brought challenging the validity of antitakeover provisions prior to the emergence of a hostile bidder), judicial relief normally should
be limited to the invalidation of the subject provisions and the issuance of an injunction
against enforcement of those and similar provisions which might otherwise be adopted in the
future.
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applied in appropriate settings," and its continued use in those settings
is desirable if this country's economy is to function efficiently. In the
context of "show-stop" maneuvers in tender offers, 45 however, the rule
serves as a sword to pierce legitimate shareholder interests rather than as
a justifiable shield for management's conduct, and thus should not be
applied.4 6
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW TO TARGET MANAGEMENT

Under the Williams Act,4 7 and SEC regulations implementing the
Act, both offeror and target managements must disclose certain information relevant to a subject tender offer.49 An offeror must disclose,
inter alia, certain prior transactions between the offeror and the target;
the source of funds to be used in the acquisition; and if material, the
applicability of anti-trust laws and pending legal proceedings related to
the tender offer.5 ° The target company must disclose, inter alia, any
material contract, agreement, or "understanding" between the target
company, its officers or directors, and the bidder company, its officers or
directors.5" The target company also must state whether it is advising
its shareholders to accept or to reject the offer, whether it is remaining
neutral with respect to the offer, or whether it is unable to take a position regarding the offer. Whatever the recommendation advanced, the
48

44. At least three policy considerations support appropriate application of the business
judgment rule:
First, if management were liable for mere good faith errors in judgment, few capable individuals would be willing to incur the financial and emotional risks of serving
in such roles. Second, courts are generally ill equipped to evaluate business judgments. Finally, management has the expertise to discharge the responsibility of
making such determinations.
M. STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 236 (citing Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1982), Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926-27 (1979), and Corporate Director's Handbook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1603-04, 1615
(1978)).
45. A "show-stop" maneuver is any action taken by target management, such as the sale
of the company's crown jewel, which has the effect of materially impeding or precluding
shareholders from tendering their stock to the "hostile" bidder.
46. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 904-07, 915.
47. The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78
m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
48. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to .14d-101, 240.14e-1 to .14e-2 (1983).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (4) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3, .14d-6, .14d-9, .14d-100,
.14d-101, .14e-2 (1983).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(1) (1983); SEC sched. 14D-1, items 3, 4, 10(c), 10(e) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1983)).
51. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-9(a)(1), (c) (1983); SEC sched. 14D-9, item 3(b) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1983)).
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target corporation must disclose the reasons for its position. 52
The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act were intended by
Congress to ensure that shareholders, after hearing from both the offeror
and target corporations with neither side having an unfair advantage
over the other, would have sufficient information to make informed decisions in determining whether to tender their shares.53 As former SEC
Chairman Cohen testified, the Act's purpose was "to provide the investor, the person who is required to make a decision, an opportunity to
examine and to assess the relevant facts and to reach a decision without
being pressured and without being subject to unwarranted techniques
which are designed to prevent that from happening."5 4 As noted elsewhere "[d]isclosure, no matter how extensive, matters little if the target's
management can employ defensive tactics that deprive or otherwise materially impede the investor's freedom of choice." 55 It follows logically
that target management properly should be permitted to take defensive
actions under the Williams Act that do not preclude or materially impede shareholders from tendering their stock so long as there is full disclosure. 56 On the other hand, maneuvers by target management that
deny shareholders an opportunity to tender their shares should be held
52. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-9(a)(l), (c), (d)(1)(i), .14e-2(a) (1983); SEC sched. 14D-9, item 4
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1983)).
53. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF
CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKE-

BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE
TAKEOVER BIDS]. See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 642 (1982) (Illinois Business Takeover Act held unconstitutional under the commerce clause), in which Justice White stated:
We . . .agree with the Court of Appeals that [in passing the Williams Act] Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any undue
advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice.
• . .Looking at [the history of the Act] as a whole, it appears to us, as it did
to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to strike a balance between the
investor, management, and the takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and the target company with adequate information but there was no "intent[ion] to do . . . more than give incumbent management an opportunity to
express and explain its position." Once that opportunity was extended, Congress
anticipated that the investor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free
to move forward within the time frame provided by Congress.
Id. at 634 (citations omitted) (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58
(1975)).
54. CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 53, at 15 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, SEC). For additional legislative history supporting this view, see the sources gathered in Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 901, 911-12 (1979).
55. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 911.
56. Id. at 927.
OVER
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to violate the Williams Act, absent evidence that the offeror would in57
flict some clearly foreseeable harm upon the target corporation.
The Williams Act may be applied in either of two ways to ensure
that target shareholders normally have an opportunity to accept or reject a tender offer. First, conduct by management that deprives shareholders of an opportunity to tender may be held to constitute
"constructive fraud" within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Williams
Act. 5" Although the Supreme Court held in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green5 9 that "mere" breaches of fiduciary duty not amounting to
"manipulation" or "deception" do not violate section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 6' section 14(e)
ought to be interpreted differently. Unlike section 10(b), section 14(e)
by its own terms prohibits "fraudulent" acts or practices. 6 ' This difference in statutory language and the legislative history of section 14(e) 6 2
support giving it a broader reach than section 10(b).6" Second, defen57. Cf. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1981)(grant of
lock-up options to a white knight held to be manipulative within § 14(e) of the Williams Act);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(temporary restraining order granted to prevent possibly improper manipulation under § 14(e) in the form
of selling off target's assets or destroying its corporate charter to defend against a hostile offer).
But see cases cited infta note 65.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule
lob-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1345-52 (1983); Steinberg, Fiducia Duties and Disclosure
Obligationsin Proxy and Tender Contestsfor CorporateControl, 30 EMORY L.J. 169, 226 (1981). Cf.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 185 (1963) ("scalping" by registered
investment advisor held to constitute a "fraud" upon clients within the Investment Advisors
Act).
59. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
60. Id. at 471-74. Section 10(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) and provides in part
that it is unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ..
" The statute, to a significant
degree, has been interpreted and enforced by the SEC under 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1983),
known as rule lOb-5. For discussion of Santa Fe and its ramifications, see Ferrara & Steinberg,
A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule lob-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (making it unlawful for any person, inter alia, "to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in connection with a tender
offer). Although rule lOb-5 does include fraudulent conduct within its prohibition, the
Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976), that the
scope of the rule is subject to the reach of the statute upon which it is based, namely, section
10(b).
62. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
63. See Loewenstein, supra note 58, at 1348:
In light of the meticulous attention the [Supreme] Court has paid to statutory language in its recent securities law decisions, one can easily imagine the Court saying
that if Congress wanted section 14(e) to be construed identically to section 10(b), it
could have easily done so by utilizing identical language. Failing to do this, and
having purposefully used the ambiguous term "fraudulent," Congress "intended"
the courts to give broader meaning to section 14(e) than to section 10(b).
(Footnotes omitted). Although Professor Loewenstein ultimately rejects the above argument,
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sive tactics, the practical effect of which is to prevent shareholders from
tendering in response to a bid, may be viewed as "manipulative" under
section 14(e). Under this rationale, target management may be found to
have engaged in "manipulative" practices proscribed by section 14(e)
when it undertakes maneuvers that artificially impede the operation of a
fair market for the corporation's stock, such as granting options on valuable corporate assets to friendly third parties.6 4 Unfortunately, a
number of courts have declined to adopt either of the above rationales.6 5
Congress therefore should consider enacting additional legislation to
make more explicit the protective policies of the Williams Act.
Even absent Congressional action, the Act's legislative history suggests that the SEC could exercise its broad rulemaking power under section 14(e) to the same effect. Section 14(e) grants the SEC authority to
promulgate rules and regulations which are "reasonably designed to
prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative." 6 6 Although the Commission has used this authority to promulgate a number of rules,67 it thus far has declined to address the serious
"fraudulent, deceptive, [and] manipulative" misconduct that prevails in
the tender offer context."
because "it presumes too much regarding congressional intent," he concludes that, based on
legislative intent, section 14(e) has a broader reach than section 10(b). Id. at 1349-52.
64. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Jordan v. Global
Natural Resources, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,179 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 19, 1983); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172
(N.D. Ohio 1982); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's ProhibitionAgainst Manipulation,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manip&ulative Under Section 14(e),
84 COLUM. L. REV. 228 (1984); see also Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can
Federal Law be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337 (1983);
Silberberg & Pollack, Are the Courts Expanding the Meaning of "Manipulation" Under the Federal
Securities Laws?, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 265 (1983); Note, Lock-up Options: Toward A State Law
Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1069-72 (1983).
65. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., [current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) $ 91,407 (3d Cir. 1984); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722
F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628-30 (D. Md. 1982); Berman v. Gerber Products
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1317-18 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
67. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-I to .14e-3 (1983). For discussion of these rules, see M.
STEINBERG, supra note 1,at §§ 3.06, 11.07; Bloomenthal, The New Tender O erRegimen, State
Regulation, and Preemption, 30 EMORY L.J. 35, 35-57 (1981).
68. Indeed, the Commission recently asserted that the business judgment rule should not
be the principal governor of decisions made by target management in the midst of a tender
offer. See SEC Faults Advisory Panel'sReliance on BusinessJudgment Rule in Takeovers, 16 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 495-96 (Mar. 16, 1984).
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On the other hand, recent SEC actions may indicate that the Commission is becoming more cognizant of its responsibility to mandate
more meaningful disclosure of potentially abusive target managerial
practices. For example, Commission rules now require that the terms of
"golden parachute" agreements be disclosed.6 9 In a recent enforcement
action, the SEC also emphasized the need for management to disclose
the material effects of anti-takeover proposals.7" These actions are laudable, but much information within the possession of target management
and important to shareholders remains undisclosed. 7 It is to be hoped
that the SEC will continue to exercise its rulemaking and adjudicatory
72
authority under the Act to fill the disclosure gap.
Another potential problem associated with the use of defensive ma69. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 20,220 (Sept. 23, 1983), Amendment to Item of
Regulation S-K, Item 402, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,467 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402) (requiring disclosure in Item 402(e) of any remuneration plan exceeding $60,000
for any corporate fiduciary included in the "cash compensation table," where such plan becomes effective on the resignation, retirement, or other termination of employment of such
person, a change in control of the company, or a change in such person's responsibilities
subsequent to a change in control).
70. See SEC v. Dorchester, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,613 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1984); accord SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,504 (Jan. 13, 1984), 3
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,120B. There, the Commission stated:
The Commission again wishes to emphasize the need for adequate and accurate disclosure with respect to anti-takeover and other defensive measures ("antitakeover measures"). Such measures are designed to deter contests for control or
unfriendly takeovers, by making the subject company unattractive as a potential
target and by making it more difficult to change a majority of the board of directors
or to remove management. The anti-takeover measures also may help management
to insulate a proposed corporate transaction, such as a merger or acquisition, from
unwanted competition.
Companies must disclose all the material effects of anti-takeover measures,
including their impact on- any proposed corporate transaction, whether hostile or
friendly. It is also important that management's interest in the corporate transaction (including the existence of any actual or potential conflicts of interests) and the
ultimate effect of the anti-takeover measures on shareholders be disclosed. Absent
such disclosure, shareholders will be unable to make informed voting decisions on
the matters being proposed. It is especially important, when management is considering or pursuing a leveraged buy-out with its attendant serious conflicts of interest,
that full and fair disclosure of the impact of the anti-takeover measures on the proposed transaction be made.
(footnotes omitted).
71. For example, specific SEC rules and regulations should require disclosure of the underlying purposes and ultimate effects of defensive maneuvers taken both prior to and during
a takeover bid, the existence of any managerial policy designed to maintain the corporation
as an independent entity, and the costs of conducting and defending takeover bids, including
attorney and investment banker fees.
72. Certain SEC rules and regulations require that "purpose" be disclosed. See, e.g.,
Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101c, Item 4 (1983); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-l(a)(2) (1983);
Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100H, Item 7(a) (1983). As to disclosing the "effect" of
the transaction, see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,230 (Oct. 13, 1978) [1978 Transfer
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neuvers by subject corporation management is the ready access to the
courts that is granted to management on both sides of a takeover struggle. Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries73 that a defeated tender offeror does not have standing under
section 14(e) to bring an action for damages,7 4 a majority of lower federal courts have permitted actions for injunctive relief under sections
13(d) 75 and 14(e). 76 This approach, on the whole, seems correct. The
target corporation often may be the only party with the readily available resources and motivation necessary to maintain a successful injunctive action against a bidder that would harm the company and its
shareholders. 77 Granting standing to an issuer therefore may be a prac-

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,748. For further discussion, see M. STEINBERG, supra
note 1, at § 1.04.
73. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
74. Id. at 24-42.
75. Courts have permitted actions brought by target managements for injunctive relief
under section 13(d). See, e.g., Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex,
Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Schnell v. Schnall,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,927 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1981). See
generally Note, An Imphed Right of Action for Issuers Under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 61 B.U.L. REv. 933 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,An ImpledRight ofAction]; Note,
Private Litigation Under the Wilhams Act. Standing to Sue, Elements of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J.
CORP. L. 545, 559-61 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Private Litigation]; Note, ImpliedPrivate
Rights of Action for Equitable Rehef under Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 869
[hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Private Rights of Action ]; Note, Section 13(d) of the '31 Act. The
Inference of a Private Cause of Action for a Stock Issuer, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971 (1981).
Generally, section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act and rule 13d-1 promulgated thereunder require any person or group of persons who acquire beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of a class of equity securities registered under section 12 of the Act to disclose,
within ten days, specific information by filing a schedule 13D with the SEC and by sending
copies to the issuer and to each exchange on which the security is traded. For further discussion of section 13(d), see M. STEINBERG, supra note 1, at § 9.03[5].
76. Courts have permitted both target and offeror managements to bring actions for injunctive relief under Section 14(e). See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366,
376 (6th Cir. 1981); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F.
Supp. 468, 475-76, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 613, 614-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally Comment, Prelimina Injunctive Reliefand
Tender Offers- An Analysis Under the Williams Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563 (1981).
77. The SEC is a proper party to seek injunctive relief for disclosure violations under
sections 13(d) and 14(e). Given the Commission's heavy workload and its manpower
shortages, however, the SEC often lacks the resources to act on a timely basis. See J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). It may well be necessary to grant standing to
competing bidders seeking injunctive relief, particularly if target management is aligned with
the friendly offeror. In such a situation, a competing offeror may well be the only available
party willing to bring a suit for injunctive relief which will ultimately benefit the target corporation and its shareholders. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 371 (6th
Cir. 1981); see also Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 301; The Business Roundtable, The Role and
Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Phubhcy Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083,
2099-2101 (1978).
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tical approach to protecting the integrity of the marketplace and the
interests of shareholders. 7"
It should not be presumed, however, that noble motives always lie
behind subject companies' suits for injunctive relief. Target managements may seek access to the courts not to vindicate shareholder interests but rather to seek delay, thereby gathering the time needed to
develop successful strategies for defending and perpetuating their control.7 9 Indiscriminately granting standing to such parties to bring actions for injunctive relief may be detrimental, rather than helpful, to the
shareholders who are the primary beneficiaries of the Williams Act.
Courts therefore should grant standing only after independently determining that the party seeking to invoke injunctive relief is acting for the
target corporation's and shareholders' benefit."0
As set forth above, the primary beneficiaries of the Williams Act
are the target corporation's shareholders who are entitled to make informed investment decisions without being unduly hampered by techniques and maneuvers employed by the offeror(s)' and subject
corporation's managements. There ought, however, to be a narrow, implicit exception to such an interpretation of the Williams Act. That exception would permit target management to take appropriate action to
defeat a hostile offer if it could demonstrate affirmatively that the offeror represented a clear threat to the corporation's business, including
the equity interests of its shareholders. Although not apparently permitted under the Act, t Congress should also allow target management to

78. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex, Ltd., 624
F.2d 1216, 1225 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1979); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v.
American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American
Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);seealso Note,An Implied Right of Action,
supra note 75, at 963-64; Comment, supra note 76, at 576-77; Note, Private Litigation,supra note
75, at 561; Note, Imphed Private Rights of Action, supra note 75, at 881.
79. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1155 (1982). "When managers face the sort of conflict that every tender offer presents, a
conflict between investors' interests and managers' continued employment, it is altogether too
easy for managers to find-to their delight-that some ethical principle enables them to take
the high road of defending against the acquisition." Id. at 1176.
80. Cf. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), dicussed supra note 21.
81. The Williams Act has been interpreted as intended solely for the benefit of investor
shareholders. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26-35 (1977) ("[Tjhe sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender
offer."; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for
their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party."). Given this judicial interpretation of the Act,
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consider noninvestor concerns that merit protection such as the job security of the corporation's employees and the viability of the communities in which it primarily operates.8 2 Because the individual shareholder
is concerned principally with his or her own investment, management
may be deemed the most appropriate decisionmaker to assess these
83
larger societal concerns.
If enacted, such an exception must be carefully limited. If the statutory language of an exception based on noninvestor interests were unduly broad, target management, in practically all instances, could argue
plausibly that a takeover bid would harm employees, customers, suppliers, and the community. Legislative or judicial acceptance of the asserted protection of such noninvestor interests without careful scrutiny
would provide a smoke screen masking target management's actual motives. To reconcile the competing considerations, the framework proposed permits the subject corporation's management to undertake
defensive maneuvers based on noninvestor interests but only if such maneuvers are warranted. That is, management must prove that the
tender offeror presents a clear threat to deserving societal interests.8 4
The expansive construction given by many courts to the business
judgment rule,85 in conjunction with state anti-takeover statutes that
protect incumbent management,8 6 strongly suggest that any meaningful
shareholder protection and reforms in the tender offer area must come
from existing federal law and the implementation of further Congressional and SEC action. Thus, the unduly narrow interpretation given
by a number of federal courts to the Williams Act8 7 is unfortunate. By
allowing target management to take action based upon non-shareholder interests could well
be viewed as antithetical to the Act's purpose and thus not permitted.
82. These interests may include the stake of loyal employees in continued employment,
the corporation's responsibility to the environment, and the community's reliance on the corporation as a local employer. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-96 (10th
Cir. 1972) (applying Colorado law), discussedsupra notes 35, 41 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 130 (1979);
Williams, supra note 24, at 963; supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Lipton goes so far
as to argue that, regarding management's response to a hostile tender offer, "[niational policy
is a proper consideration." Lipton, supra, at 130. Directly opposed to the views of Lipton are
those of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel who contend that, because cash tender offers are
beneficial and lead to more efficient management, any attempt by the subject corporation's
management to impede such an offer should be proscribed. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
15, at 1164. See Gilson,A StructuredApproach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 862-65 (1981).
84. A lesser standard would only increase the opportunities for corporate malfeasance,
thereby conflicting with the rationale underlying the Williams Act as well as with management's fiduciary duties under state law. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 913 n.55.
85. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
86. See statutes cited infra note 90.
87. See cases cited supra note 65.
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construing section 14(e) as solely a disclosure statute, those courts are
ignoring the Act's legislative history: its provisions are to have a broader
reach.8" As important, by relegating aggrieved shareholders to state
court processes when it is unnecessary to do so, the federal courts are
ensuring that shareholders' meritorious claims are left without a viable
remedy.
ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

In addition to the foregoing suggestions, it would be appropriate
for Congress to act to remedy other deficiencies in the tender offer process. Two-tier offers, for example, have not been viewed as "fraudulent"
or "manipulative" by the few courts to have considered the issue.8 9
Such offers nevertheless constitute a coercive tactical ploy that enables
an offeror to acquire control through a partial tender offer at one price
and then to squeeze-out minority shareholders at a substantially lower
price.' Partial tender offers may have become too firmly established to
be eliminated, even if their elimination were desirable,9 1 but basic prin88. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (D. Md.
1982); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1314 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
90. One justification sometimes given for the higher front-end tender offer price is that
the differential between the first and second tiers represents a premium paid for control. Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 727 (1981). The payment
and receipt of premiums for control have received judicial approbation in non-tender contexts. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1979) (controlling interest may be purchased and sold at a premium over market price).
Front-end loaded offers nonetheless provide potential for abusive tactics and practices, since
shareholders recognize that they must either tender or be relegated to a substantially lower
second-step squeeze-out merger price if the takeover bid is successful. See ADVISORY COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 24-26; Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Sharesin CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 336-37 (1974); Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection
Against Two- Tier and PartialTender Offers: The Validity of Fair j37ce, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over
Provisions Under Delaware Law, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 293 (1984). At least three states, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, have enacted statutes that address the potential abuses associated with second-step squeeze-out mergers. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. §§ 3-202,
3-601-03, 8-301(12)-(14) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 (Page Supp.
1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 408, 409.1, 910 (Purdon 1983). In connection with the
constitutional concerns raised by these statutes, see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982) (Illinois Business Takeover Act declared unconstitutional on interstate commerce
grounds; Justices White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger also would have held the
state act unconstitutional under the supremacy clause). See generally Sargent, On the Vahdi'ty of
State Takeover Regulation State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1981);
Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland FairPice Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266
(1984); Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 184 (1984).
91. Justice Goldberg, pointing to the English regulatory framework, recommends that the
two-tier offer be prohibited, unless there are exceptional circumstances present. Goldberg,
supra note 1 at 233-34. Although there is merit to this suggestion, such an approach would
preclude an offeror from making a tender offer for an inefficiently managed target corpora-
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ciples of fair dealing should be applied to the takeover process. Fairness
requires that an offeror who obtains control pursuant to a partial tender
offer normally be permitted to acquire no additional equity securities of
the subject corporation unless (1) the offeror proves that changed economic circumstances justify the lower price, or (2) the offeror pays the
same or a higher price for the shares in the second step as it paid for the
shares tendered.9 2
Another inequity under current law is that a beneficial owner of
more than five percent of a subject security need not disclose such ownership until ten days after attaining that status.9 3 Persons are free to
seek additional acquisitions through privately negotiated transactions
and open market purchases during that ten day period as long as the
acquisitions do not constitute a "tender offer." 9 4 This makes possible
the rapid accumulation of securities representing a potential shift in corporate control without notification and disclosure of pertinent information if the offeror lacked the funds-necessary to acquire the entire company. I believe that
society, on the whole, benefits from permitting the acquisition of controlling interests in these
and related circumstances. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 24-25.
Moreover, shareholders wishing to tender in a partial offer can be adequately protected by (1)
having their shares accepted on a pro rata basis throughout the duration of the offer, and (2)
requiring that any second-step squeeze-out transaction be at the same price. See SEC Rule
14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983).
92. Maryland recently passed legislation designed to protect non-tendering minority
shareholders from being unfairly squeezed out in second-tier transactions. Act of June 2,
1983, ch. 1, Sp. Sess. (codified at MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-202, 3-601 to 3-603,
8-301 (12)-(14) (1975 & Supp. 1983)). Under the new legislation, most second-tier transactions must be approved by a supermajority vote (4/5 of all votes entitled to be cast and 2/3 of
votes entitled to be cast by shareholders who are neither "interested" nor "affiliated" with
interested shareholders). Id. at § 3-602. The supermajority vote requirement does not apply,
however, if non-tendering minority shareholders receive at least as much for their shares as
tendering shareholders received for theirs, and if certain additional conditions are met, or if
the corporation otherwise qualifies for an exemption. Id. at § 3-603(b)-(e). See generall Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 90.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 0 40.13d-101 (1983). See M. STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at § 9.03[5]. The information required by schedule 13D includes
the identity of the issuer and the security, the identity, background and citizenship
of the reporting persons, the source and amount of funds used to acquire the securities, the purpose of the transaction, the reporting person's interest in the securities
including trading history for the last 60 days and any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships with respect to the securities to which the reporting
person or group is a party.
Bialkin, Attura & D'Alimonte, Why, When and How to Conduct a Proxy Fightfor CorporateControl,
in PROXY CONTESTS AND BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 117 (Practising Law Institute 1981).
94. A number of courts have addressed the question of what constitutes a tender offer.
See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,818-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),afd on othergrounds,
682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities,
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance,
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tion to the marketplace, and is inconsistent with the purpose of section
13(d).95 Congress should close this loophole by either (1) prohibiting
additional accumulations above the five percent level unless there has
been prior disclosure of the requisite information, 96 or (2) deeming acquisition of more than ten percent or some other appropriate level of
beneficial ownership of a security, with certain exceptions, to constitute
a tender offer, thereby triggering the disclosure and dissemination requirements of the Williams Act.9 7
"Greenmail" is another practice which merits congressional atten[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978); S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978).
In determining whether a tender offer was made, the general criteria utilized by the
courts include: "(1) whether the transactions place pressure on the solicited shareholders to
sell without deliberation; (2) the sophistication of the selling shareholders; (3) the opportunity
for negotiation; and (4) access of the solicitees to the kind of information generally available
in connection with a tender offer." Bloomenthal, supra note 67, at 42. The SEC proposed for
comment rules which sought to define the term "tender offer". See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16385, Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, 44 Fed. Reg. 70, 349 (1979).
The Commission, however, thus far has declined to take further action.
95. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th CONG., 2d
SESS., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON TENDER OFFER LAWS 55, 56
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFER LAWS]. Cf. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 21-22. The Advisory Committee would prohibit additional
purchases above the five percent level unless the requisite information has been on file with
the SEC for at least a forty-eight hour period. This position is unwise. Pre-acquisition delay
of that sort would provide target management with substantial time to implement defensive
maneuvers, thereby undermining the neutrality as between offeror and target that Congress
built into the Williams Act. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-39 (1982). See also
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975).
97. Although the ten percent level of beneficial ownership proposed in the text is arbitrarily set, a shareholder with that percentage of voting shares may exercise what amounts to a
controlling or a substantial influence in some publicly-held corporations. This is especially
true when stock ownership is combined with the persuasive authority of, for example, a position as a corporate officer. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-

TION 445-56 (1983). Of course, certain transactions, such as purely privately negotiated
purchases, should be permitted without requiring the prospective acquiror to make a tender
offer. In 1980, the SEC proposed legislation to require that acquisition of more than ten
percent of a subject corporation's shares generally be made only by means of a tender offer.
See TENDER OFFER LAws, supra note 96, at 62 ("The Commission proposes to amend section
14(d) by defining the term 'statutory offer' to mean all offers to acquire the beneficial ownership of equity securities of a public issuer by a person who is or could thereby become the
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the class. Exceptions to the definition are made
for: (1) offers pursuant to a statutory merger or acquisition, (2) the solicitation of voting proxies, (3) acquisitions of 2 percent per year, (4) acquisition from the issuer, (5) acquisitions from
no more than 10 persons in any 12 months pursuant to privately negotiated transactions.").
Cf ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 22-23 (acquisitions which would give

the acquiror more than 20% of the voting power in a corporation should be permitted only if
obtained from the offeror or by means of a tender offer).
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tion.98 When a subject corporation's incumbent management causes the
corporation to repurchase, at a substantial premium, the stock acquired
by a potential bidder, management should be deemed to have a conflict
of interest that precludes application of the business judgment rule. Unfortunately, present law is not clear on this point. 9 Congress therefore
should consider adopting legislation which requires incumbent management to prove affirmatively that such a stock repurchase was in the corporation's best interests and at a fair price." ° Shareholders should be
provided a cause of action similar to that available under section 36(b)
of the Investment Advisers Act to enable them to challenge these
repurchases,Ol
As a policy matter, Congress also should establish a ceiling on monetary damages assessed against corporate fiduciaries under the Williams
Act, except where there has been egregious misconduct. In all practicality, courts have declined to construe the Williams Act and state fiduciary law restrictively whenever a finding of liability would result in
astronomical monetary damages.1" 2 The Seventh Circuit's unduly nar-

98. "Greenmail" has been defined as "[t]he practice of buying a portion of a company's
stock and threatening the company with a hostile takeover fight unless management agrees to
buy back [the] shares at a premium." SEC Faults Adozsog Panels' Reliance on Business Judgment
Rule in Takeovers, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 496 (Mar. 16, 1984).
99. Compare Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (198 1) (broad application of the business judgment rule in the context of a
tender offer), and Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980)(same), with
Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981)(the burden is on directors to
justify the issuer's repurchase of shares in a hostile tender offer situation).
100. Alternatively, Congress should adopt the Advisory Committee's recommendation
that "[r]epurchase of a company's shares at a premium to market from a particular holder or
group that has held such shares for less than two years should require shareholder approval."
ADVISORY COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 46. Although this alternative is an improvement on the application of the business judgment rule, particularly if the shareholder
vote is required to be disinterested and informed, a court's careful scrutiny of the fairness of
the transaction arguably will better protect the integrity of the takeover process and shareholder interests. See generally supra notes 22, 23 and accompanying text.
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b) (1982). Section 36(b) generally permits an action to be
brought by the SEC, or by a security holder of a registered investment company on behalf of
such company, to recover from the investment adviser, any person affiliated with such investment adviser, and certain other persons any compensation or payments, "for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment
company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person." See also
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 842 (1984) (demand on board of directors of
registered investment company not required in suit brought by shareholders pursuant to section 36(b)).
102. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 286 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Products
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); see also Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669
F.2d 366, 374-75 (6th Cir. 1981) (court's construction of "manipulation" was formulated
where no monetary liability recovered).
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row interpretation of federal and state law in Panter v. MarshallField &
Co. ,'13 for example, might best be viewed in light of the fact that plaintiffs sought damages exceeding $200 million.' 0 4 A finding of liability in
such an amount could not only bankrupt the subject company and its
management, 0 5 but also wreak havoc upon our system of corporate
governance. Few corporate directors would be willing to mount even
minimal opposition to detrimental takeover bids; indeed, outside directors could be expected to resign their positions rather than risk financial
catastrophe.
Congress should recognize the importance of the policy considerations involved in this unique context by enacting an appropriate ceiling
on damages. Such a ceiling must be high enough to deter target management from viewing violation of the law as a mere business expense.
To further inhibit management from pursuing its own survival at all
costs,' ° 6 the limit on damages should not be applicable in cases of egregious misconduct. 0 7
Justice Goldberg's provocative article suggests a number of other,
more fundamental changes that Congress might make in the tender offer regulatory framework. 0 8 Imposition of substantially longer time periods for offers to remain open, appointment of an independent reviewer
to evaluate the fairness of tender offers, and provision of a "freeze" period sufficient to enable shareholders to make informed decisions are
103. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
104. 646 F.2d at 283. Plaintiffs in Marshall Field apparently were seeking the benefit of
their bargain. For recent application of the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages in
securities litigation, see Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 1982); Osofsky
v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111-15 (2d Cir. 1981). For further discussion of MarshallField see supra
note 2; M. STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 212-16.
105. The extent of adverse consequences for the subject parties would depend on whether
the defendant corporate fiduciaries were entitled to be indemnified by the corporation and
whether insurance was available to cover the damages assessed. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 5 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks.New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Ofters, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968);
Johnson, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurancefor Directors and O1fisers, 33 Bus. LAW.
1993 (1978); Hill, Lloyd's Offers US Concerns Insurancefor Costs of FightingHostile Takeovers, Wall
St. J., May 12, 1980, at 14, col. 2 ("A policy will pay 80% of most costs associated with
fending off an unwanted takeover up to $1 million. One big catch: A company must win to
collect on the insurance.").
106. See Nagelvoort, Kudosfor Management, Not Darts, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1984, at F3, col.
1 (referring to criticism leveled against Gulfs failure to use all defensive options in its arsenal
to ward off offerors, including Standard Oil Co. of California, as "distorted because it focuses
on 'survival at all costs' rather than on the proper responsibilities of managers in public
corporations.").
107. It is beyond the scope of this article to propose an appropriate ceiling. Note, however,
the ceiling built into the ALI DRAFT RESTATEMENT, set forth supra note 43.
108. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 229-235.
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meritorious concepts which deserve congressional attention.'0 9 Justice
Goldberg also astutely perceives that for too long the interests of the
offeror's shareholders have been overlooked.
Tender offers frequently resemble mergers in their practical effect,
yet the rights of the offeror's shareholders vary greatly depending upon
which form a transaction takes.'" 0 Shareholders normally have the right
to approve mergers,"' and federal legislation assures that the proxy disclosure process will provide them with sufficient information to do so
knowledgeably."12 In contrast, the offeror's shareholders usually have
neither voting nor disclosure rights in connection with tender offers.
One might argue that this is a matter of internal corporate governance
that should be left to state regulation,' ' 3 but in the analogous proxy
setting Congress has recognized that the disclosure and dissemination of
adequate information to shareholders is a proper subject of federal regulation." 4 Hence, Congress should consider requiring offerors to disclose

109. Id at 229-30, 232-33. Some of these concepts are not as novel as they may appear.
For example, the Advisory Committee itself recommended that the bid time periods be
lengthened, but not to the extent suggested by Justice Goldberg. ADVISORY COMMITrEE
REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-28 (recommending a minimum offering period of 30 days for an
initial bid, 20 days for a subsequent one). Under current SEC rules tender offers must be held
open for at least twenty business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1983). The concept of a
"freeze" period also has been advanced by Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 317-18. The concept
of a special review person has received approbation from both the Supreme Court of Delaware and the SEC in the going private context. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
709 n.7 (Del. 1983); In re Spartek, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14,
1979).
110. Somewhat analogously and apparently without good reason, there are significantly
more regulatory impediments to undertaking an exchange offer (in lieu of a cash tender offer)
than to making a cash tender offer. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
Because of this inequality of regulation, there are far more cash tender offers than exchange
offers. See Austin, supra note 7, at 15, 36. The SEC Advisory Committee concluded that the
more extensive regulation of exchange offers is unnecessary for shareholder protection and
recommended that "[clash and securities tender offers should be placed on an equal regulatory footing so that bidders, the market and shareholders, and not regulation, decide between
the two." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 251 (c), (0, 252(c), (e) (1983); MD. CORPS & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. § 3-105(d) (1975 & Supp. 1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 73 (1982).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-102 (1983). See Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970) (noting that the underlying purpose of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act is to promote " 'the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders' by ensuring that proxies [are] solicited with 'explanation to the stockholder of the
real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.' ") (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1934)); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
113. See generally Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management
lntegnry and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555, 563 (1981).
114. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 77, 83, 103; Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note
113, at 559; authorities cited supra note 112.
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to their shareholders, at the time that a tender offer is publicly announced, information sufficient to allow them to determine whether the
takeover bid is in the corporation's best interests from both a short- and
long-term perspective. " 5
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

The analysis and proposals set forth in this Article are a response to
current judicial and SEC thinking on tender offers, which frequently
presumes that subject corporations' managements are acting in their
shareholders' best interests. Unfortunately, the converse is all too often
true. Management, when anticipating or in the midst of a tender offer,
sometimes acts in its own interests, neglecting the valid interests of
shareholders, employees, and affected communities. Judicial and SEC
deference to managerial processes and decisionmaking therefore is unwarranted. If the courts and the SEC choose not to face this stark reality, then Congress should act to reaffirm that the primary beneficiaries
of the Williams Act, the subject corporation's shareholders, normally are
entitled to make their investment decisions without being preempted by
defensive maneuvers.
Consideration also ought to be given to whether the entire administrative and judicial framework for the resolution of tender offer disputes
needs restructuring. It may be argued that federal district courts, on the
whole, have little expertise in dealing with the complicated issues surrounding tender offers. In any given tender offer situation, furthermore,
suits may well be brought in a number of district courts situated
throughout the country." 6 The net result is potentially inefficient, timeconsuming, costly, and non-uniform litigation. In light of these
problems, Congress should consider vesting with the SEC exclusive orig115. Failure to make a truthful and accurate disclosure of information would be actionable in suits for injunctive relief and actions for damages pursuant to section 14(e). Moreover,
if shareholders receive adequate information, they could seek an injunction against the tender
offer in state court based on management's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, or take other
appropriate measures to protect themselves from financial injury. Federal courts have found
nondisclosures to be material where adequate disclosure would have enabled shareholders to
obtain state court relief or take other protective measures. See, e.g., United States v. Margala,
662 F.2d 622, 625-27 (9th Cir. 1981); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641,
647-48 (3d Cir. 1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1069 (1978). As an alternative measure, albeit frequently a futile one, aggrieved
shareholders may bring an action against management for waste or seek to vote the "rascals"
out in the next election. For a restrictive view, see Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-79
(9th Cir. 1981) cert. denid, 102 S. Ct. 1006 (1982).
116. During the Bendix-Martin Marietta struggle, for instance, actions were brought in
two federal courts in New York, the federal court in Maryland, a federal and a state court in
Michigan, and two state courts in Delaware. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F.
Supp. 623, 626 (D. Md. 1982).
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inal jurisdiction to bring administrative enforcement actions" t 7 and to
resolve disputes arising between private parties in the tender offer setting, except where a damages remedy or injunctive relief is sought after
a takeover bid has been consummated or defeated."' As with administrative matters under present law, legislation could provide for appeal of
the Commission's decisions to the United States Courts of Appeals." 9
The suggested approach, if successful, would provide the SEC with a
meaningful enforcement mechanism to protect the investing public and
the integrity of the securities markets in this fast-moving context. It also
would provide corporations and their shareholders with expeditious and
uniform decisions by an expert body and the right to federal appellate
court review. In theory, implementation of the proposal would result in
a significant improvement over our present system.
In order for this proposal to be successfully implemented, the SEC
would have to be provided with sufficient resources to enable the agency
to adjudicate these matters on an expedited basis. This approach is
based on a number of underlying assumptions which, although not
tested empirically, appear plausible. Those assumptions include that
the SEC's expanded oversight and adjudicatory authority in the tender
offer area would not be unduly expensive, would result in more expeditious, uniform, and sound interpretations, and would be administratively feasible. Admittedly, all of these propositions are subject to
challenge. The proposal is offered nonetheless as an arguably attractive
alternative to the present system, and a useful vehicle for considering
how the present tender offer regulatory system can be improved.

117. The SEC recently asked Congress for legislation which would, inter alia, provide the
Commission with authority to bring administrative proceedings against persons who file misleading statements with the SEC in connection with the making of a tender offer. See SEC to
Seek Expansion ofAuthority to Bring Administrative Proceedings, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
7, at 267 (Feb. 17, 1984). The proposal has generated opposition. See Nelson, Legislative Effbrts
Dominate Spring Meeting, Legal Times of Wash., Apr. 16, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
118. Unless Congress legislates to preempt state regulation of takeovers, as the SEC Advisory Committee recommended, ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 17, suits

could be brought in the state courts even if the SEC obtains exclusive original jurisdiction in
the federal regulatory setting. See supra note 116. The propriety of preempting state tender
offer regulation by means of federal legislation is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, while such state regulation continues in effect, the proposal advanced here offers a more
attractive approach than the present federal regulatory framework.

119. See, e.g. , Securities Act of 1933, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (1982); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1982).

